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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the exchange rate uncertainty on investment under 
different exchange rate regimes. The paper presents a theoretical model where ex-
change rate is a stochastic process and investment decision behaves as a Real Option. 
The paper evaluates the performance of a new project investment under free float, 
fixed and intermediate exchange rate regimes (managed float and crawling peg). The 
comparison among the different regimes shows that the crawling peg has advanta-
ges when compared to other regimes. The regime stability implies that less currency 
devaluations are necessary to stimulate investment, especially when there is a significant 
loss of market power in foreign markets.
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Resumo
Este artigo estuda o impacto da incerteza a respeito da taxa de câmbio no investimento 
sob diferentes regimes de câmbio. O artigo apresenta um modelo teórico em que a taxa 
de câmbio é um processo estocástico e o investimento se comporta como uma opção 
real. O artigo avalia o desempenho de um novo projeto de investimento sob taxas de 
câmbio flutuante, fixa e intermediária (flutuação administrada e bandas). A comparação 
entre os diferentes regimes mostra que o regime de bandas cambiais possui vantagens 
quando comparados aos outros regimes. A estabilidade do regime implica que menores 
desvalorizações são necessárias para estimular o investimento, especialmente quando 
há uma perda significativa de poder de mercado nos mercados externos.
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1. Introduction
In the economic literature, there is the recognition that the exchan-
ge rate has a relevant role in open economies. Exchange rates in-
fluence many economic variables such as domestic prices, through 
the pass-through mechanism, and the product, through its impact 
on the balance of payments. However, some studies emphasize its 
importance for the explanation of other product components (Rose, 
1994; Flood and Rose, 1995) and more specifically on investment 
(Goldberg, 1993; Darby et al., 1999; Campa and Goldberg, 1999). In 
theory, movements in the exchange rate have at least two direct and 
opposite effects on investment. Exchange rate depreciation implies 
an increase of the export’s income and a restriction to the entrance 
of new competitors. On the other hand, it also implies an increase in 
import costs. Moreover, a movement in the exchange rate may be a 
source of uncertainty for agents that evaluate the viability of a new 
investment project. In this situation, the exchange rate volatility can 
be as much as or more relevant than the explanation of the invest-
ment at its nominal level (Caballero and Cobo, 1989).
Firms make new investments in order to create and take advantage 
of profitable opportunities. However, investment can be irreversible 
because the capital can be firm specific or sector specific. In ge-
neral, capital goods are produced fitted to a specific firm and they 
probably will only be able to be used by one firm, because their sale 
may implicate in the revelation of a business secret. Furthermore, it 
would be difficult to sell an unsuccessful firm, so it will be sold at a 
lower value than its implantation cost, hence generating a great loss 
to the investor. The possibility of an unrecoverable loss makes the 
investment more sensitive to several risk forms, such as the uncer-
tainty regarding good prices and input costs. 
Another important aspect to be considered is that investments can 
be postponed. New information can bring about scenarios that can 
be favorable or unfavorable in the future. In both cases, it is possible 
to be optimal, to wait and execute the investment project later on. 
In the case of a favorable scenario, the postponement guarantees the 
exclusion of a low revenue operation period. In the adverse scena-
rio, the waiting period can have a long duration and the investment 
project may not be executed (Pindyck, 1986; McDonald and Siegel, 
1986; Dixit, 1989). 
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So, considering that new investments are in fact rights but a not 
obligation to take some action in the future in an uncertain envi-
ronment, the investment has characteristics of Real Options. Real 
Options theory potentially offers a powerful valuation tool as well 
as a systematic strategy framework to evaluate and structure re-
source investments under uncertainty (Trigeorgis, 1996; Amram and 
Kulatilaka, 1999; Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2001).
The uncertainty sources can be specific of the firm, for example, 
its acceptance in the market, or they can be generalized and affect 
all the country firms, for instance, regarding uncertainty about the 
exchange rates. This last source of uncertainty is the main interest 
of this paper since, in the economic history, several countries have 
tried to reduce the exchange rate uncertainty, establishing expli-
cit limits for its fluctuation or simply fixing it. This exchange rate 
regime change, in general, does not have the purpose of fomenting 
investment, but to guarantee price stability. 
However, it is a matter of common sense that economic stability 
creates conditions for investment projects to be executed. So, the-
re is, at this point, a theoretical gap, since there is no consolidated 
theory that connects the different exchange rate regimes and invest-
ment,1 in spite of the implications in real economy that the choice 
of exchange rate regime is one of the most relevant subjects in inter-
national economics.2 This paper presents a Real Options model for a 
new project investment that considers its irreversibility and the ex-
change rate as sources of uncertainty. The model is evaluated under 
the more usual exchange rate regimes:3 fixed, float and intermediate 
regimes, more specifically the managed float and the crawling peg. 
1 Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) developed a model that captures the option value of production 
switching between two country locations in the presence of volatile exchange rates. Darby 
et al. (1999) only analyses the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on investment under a 
floating regime. Böhn e Funke (2001) present a small open economy partial equilibrium 
model with different exchange rate regimes, but they do not use Real Options set up. 
2 For reviews of the literature on the choice of exchange rate regime, see Wickham (1985), 
Argy (1990), Edison and Melvin (1990), Obstfeld (1995) and Frankel (1999) among others.
3 Frankel (1999) identifies nine exchange rate regimes: currency union, currency board, fixed 
exchange rates, adjustable peg, crawling peg, basket peg, target zone or band, managed float and 
free float. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) group these regimes in four categories, with the 
first three corresponding to a fixed category, the next three to a crawling peg, and the last two to 
a dirty and a pure float. So, the paper covers all exchange rate regimes under this classification.
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Besides this introduction, the paper has two more sections. In the 
next section, the basic theoretical model and its extensions are pre-
sented. Its discussion is held throughout the section. At the end of 
the paper the main conclusions are presented.
2. Investment Models with Different Exchange Rate Regimes
It is very difficult to reach a consensus about the classification of 
exchange regimes. These regimes could simply be classified as fixed, 
float and intermediate (managed float and crawling peg). However, 
in practice, it is not so simple to implement a classification of this 
type. The literature shows that there is a classification publicized by 
the policymakers (de jure) and also the classification that the agents 
believe to be the true, (de facto). This distinction is necessary, since 
several policymakers are afraid to assume an explicit target and be 
susceptible to speculative attacks or to assume that the exchange 
rate is totally floating and, when there is a movement, in a direction 
that significantly affects the real economy, they cannot intervene.4 
In fact, there are incentives for policymakers not to reveal the actual 
true regime. For the firms, the decision of investing in a long term 
project is not so dependent on policymakers public announcements 
but will be based on their   perception of which regime is being 
adopted; in other words, de facto classification is what matters. 
A regime may be considered fixed if there is an explicit target for 
the nominal exchange rate and the monetary authority accomplishes 
explicit interventions to reach this target. In the free (pure) float 
regime there is no intervention form and the nominal exchange rate 
is able to assume any value between zero and infinite. Intermediate 
regimes can be of two types. The first is called “managed” (dirty) 
float. In this regime there is no explicit target for the nominal ex-
change rate, but the firms know about the existence of limits. These 
limits can be inferior (limiting valorizations) or superior (limiting 
depreciations) or both. In the latter case, this regime would have a 
similar behavior to the second type of intermediate regime studied 
in the paper, the crawling peg regime. The main difference bet-
ween these regimes is that the crawling peg makes its limits explicit. 
4 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) call it “fear of floating”. 
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However, from the practical point of view, what matters for the 
firms is a de facto regime and being this way, the two regimes are 
identical.5    
The basic model is composed by one good, produced by a represen-
tative potential entrant monopolist firm, which will be established 
in two different markets, a domestic market and a foreign market, 
with the capacity to discriminate prices. That is, the goods sold in 
one market cannot be sold in the other. The firm will decide if it 
invests or not in a new investment project where the cost is given by 
I.6 This cost is fixed and irreversible. Once implemented, will have 
an income (profit) for an infinite period. Its monopoly power in each 
market is a function of each market demand. These are given in their 
inverted form by:
                                                   (1)
        
                                                                                                      (2)
Where d denotes the domestic market and f denotes the foreign 
market. P represents the good’s price, Q represents the demanded 
quantity and ε is the demand elasticity-price.   
The good sold in the external market is paid for with foreign cur-
rency; however, it is converted into the domestic currency by a no-
minal exchange rate given by E. There are no transport costs. So, 
the monopolist’s profit, when the project is implemented, in each 
period t is given by: 
            (3)
5 It should be emphasized that the investment behavior is analyzed under these regimes; 
however, the influence of uncertainty, regarding the adopted regime, is not studied. It is 
assumed that the agents are capable of distinguishing which regime is being adopted and, 
therefore, there is only uncertainty about the exchange rate proper.  
6 The firm is not yet established, so it is not a new capacity or expansion decision as proposed 
by Trigeorgis and Mason (1987), Pindyck (1988), Dixit (1989) and Dixit (1992). 
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Where w is the marginal cost. It does not depend on the exchange 
rate because the good is only produced using local input. The mono-
polist’s profit is maximized at each market when:
                                    (4)
       
 
                                (5) 
       
So, the monopolist’s profit will be:
                        (6)
Where:
           (6.1) 
       
           (6.2) 
       
The Equation (6) establishes that the monopolist’s profit can be 
decomposed into two parts. The first term given by A is the profit 
obtained in the domestic market and the second term given by 
is the profit obtained in the foreign market. This representative firm 
should analyze the decision of investing in a new project under the 
different exchange regimes.
2.1. Fixed Exchange Rate
In the fixed exchange rate regime there is not stochastic components 
in the model. However, the monopolist firm has an exchange rate 
that triggers the investment independently from the fixed exchange 
rate. 
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Proposition 1: Consider that the monopolist firm obtains in each 
period t a profit given by (6), so the monopolist’s dynamic problem is 
. Then, the solution for this non stochastic optimiza-
tion problem is given by . 
Proof: Appendix 5.1          
Where the nominal exchange rate that makes investment viable, 
E*, is greater than zero if B>0 and A<I. These conditions mean 
that there are profits in the foreign market and that the profit share 
obtained in the domestic market is not enough to cover the invest-
ment’s present value in each period t. Otherwise, the project would 
be executed independently of the nominal exchange rate level. So, 
the main result of this model is, that under a fixed exchange regime, 
the monopolist firm will invest if . It means that under this 
regime the monopolist firm will invest, if the present value of the 
project’s future return is greater than its cost, just as predicted by 
the net present value rule (Jorgenson, 1963).  
An adjacent conclusion is that under a fixed exchange regime many 
investment projects are abandoned because they are not viable un-
der the established exchange rate ( ) In other words, the exchange 
rate fixation only implies that investments are compatible with the 
established rate., 
Even though this regime is adopted in many situations to solve un-
certainty and/or high volatility problems, this policy choice has se-
veral implications. In the first place, it is only effective to eliminate 
uncertainty if the policymaker has the capacity to maintain it during 
a long period. Otherwise, the expectation of a possible future depre-
ciation will generate, as much as or more uncertainty, than in a free 
float regime. This credibility problem had already been presented by 
Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) original work and then, the analysis 
was extended to the best exchange rate regime in the context of 
an open economy. It evaluates the cost-benefit of abandoning this 
exchange rate instrument. Economic agents realize that there may 
be future situations in which a change in the exchange rate would 
be optimal for policymakers and, therefore, the incentive arises for 
them to renege on their commitment. The credibility problem can 
only be solved if the authorities, in playing their game against the 
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other economic agents, are really able to convince agents that their 
only objective is the maintenance of fixed exchange rates, regardless 
of the costs induced by this choice of strategy. Nonetheless, exiting a 
fixed exchange rate regime, may also be costly since, in general, it is 
followed by strong depreciations7. In general, the main conclusion of 
the literature is that an exchange rate policy should be as consistent 
as possible8 to solve uncertainty problems.
2.2.   Free Float 
Consider now that the profit given by (6) is composed by determi-
nistic and stochastic components. It is assumed that the nominal 
exchange rate floats freely and that it is a stochastic process that 
follows a geometric Brownian movement. The other parameters in 
the model are assumed to be deterministic. Therefore, the nominal 
exchange rate is the only fact responsible for the uncertainty regar-
ding the future profits. Under these conditions, the monopolist’s 
dynamic problem will be:
      
Max  
                             (7)
Where  is a discount rate and z represents Wiener’s process where 
 and . The parameter μ represents the positive 
or negative increments on the nominal exchange rate over time and  
the volatility of these increments. It should be noted that the process 
variance grows linearly over time, since Var(dz)=dt and that the nomi-
nal exchange rate follows a log-normal distribution. 
Proposition 2:  If the monopolist problem is given by (7), then, the 
exchange rate critical value is . 
Proof: Appendix 5.2         
 
7 Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) are the classical references of the currency 
crisis literature. 
8  In this case, consistency is related to an exchange rate closely associated to fundamentals as 
in Krugman (1989).
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Where 1 is the positive root from the indicial equation. The con-
dition 1>f>0 is necessary to have E* greater than zero and to 
give economic sense to the problem, since A<I. This last condi-
tion means that the profit share obtained in the domestic market is 
not enough to cover the investment’s present value in each period 
t. Otherwise the project would be executed independently of the 
nominal exchange rate level. 
Note that the critical value E* under the free float regime is related 
to model parameters in a more complex way than it is under fixed 
exchange regime. Under the free float regime, investments may be 
viable due to the expectation of future depreciations, even if at 
present, the exchange rate is not favorable. Fixing the exchange rate, 
this expectation disappears. Besides, the firm should have an in-
crease on their profits to compensate the uncertainty due the nomi-
nal exchange rate.  
Corollary 1: , the firm profit present value should be greater 
than the invested value. 
Proof: Appendix 5.3          
The source of a profit increase can be a currency devaluation, since 
the optimal investment critical value (E*) rises when this occurs. 
This result can be better observed in a numerical example with 
=0.04, I=50, f = d =1.1, w=3. The results can be seen in figure 1.
Figure 1 shows that when the exchange rate volatility rises from 5% 
to 15%, the critical exchange rate that makes the investment viable 
grows from 2.05 to 2.92.  This means that a depreciation of 42.47% 
is needed, in the exchange rate, to make the option of investing op-
timal once again. This impact is larger when the depreciation trend 
is increased. An increase in the trend from 2% to 3% makes a depre-
ciation of 50.89% necessary.
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Figure 1 Critical value (E*) as a function of  and μ
Therefore, under a free float regime, the uncertainty regarding the 
exchange rate is capable of reducing the investment.9 This impact is 
larger the greater the depreciation trend. Thus, policies that seek to 
reduce the negative impact of uncertainty on investment can have 
a different effect from that expected, since the impact of uncer-
tainty also changes when the exchange rate trend is altered.10 These 
results reproduce Krugman’s (1989) ideas. According to the author, 
in a high uncertainty environment, with volatile exchange rates, the 
firms have incentives to adopt a “wait and see” behavior, regarding 
investments and negotiations with foreign markets. Huizinga (1993) 
and Bell and Campa (1997) give empirical support to this result. 
The authors found a negative relationship between the exchange 
rate volatility and the investment of European and American firms, 
respectively.   
There are, therefore, advantages and disadvantages regarding invest-
ment in both regimes. In practice, policymakers have been seen to 
adopt intermediate regimes, such as managed float and crawling peg. 
9 This result was expected once the literature on irreversible investment has already shown 
that uncertainty harms investment spending by risk-neutral firms, if the cost of reducing 
the capital stock exceeds the upward adjustment cost and if firms operate under imperfect 
competition.
10 Darby et al. (1999) also commented the role of exchange rate trends (misalignments as they 
called it) in the investment decision, but the authors did not infer any conclusion about it in 
the model. Goldberg (1993) only analyzes the impact of exchange rate volatility on invest-
ment but did not consider the impact of trend changes.
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2.3.   Exchange Rate Regime with Interventions (Managed Float)
In this regime, there is not an explicit goal for the nominal exchange 
rate, but the monetary authority intervenes, whenever it crosses a 
certain value limit. Interventions occur only at boundaries. Limits 
can be inferior or superior. Supposing that firms are capable of iden-
tifying these limits and that these can only exist, initially, in one di-
rection.11 Initially, let us consider the existence of a superior (upper) 
limit given by EH. The active firm’s value now does not more include 
the restriction on overvaluations to rule out speculative bubbles, 
since the function has a superior limit. 
Proposition 3: If a monopolistic firm faces an upper limit Eh, then the 
critical value is  and this value is identical to E*.
Proof: Appendix 5.4          
The explanation for this result is that, in this case, the reduction in 
the active firm value is equal to the reduction in the inactive firm 
value. In other words, when the future profits are reduced, the supe-
rior limit also is reduced, in the same magnitude as the opportunity 
cost of the investing option. As a result, in a managed float regime, 
with an exchange rate superior limit, there are no distortions in the 
agents’ decision. Another interesting point is that the critical value 
does not depend of the limit value established, even though it affects 
the firm’s value directly. In this model, the firm’s value is lower and, 
consequently, the firm loses money when a superior limit for the 
exchange rate is established. The remaining model interpretations 
are similar to the free float regime model; however, it changes when 
there is an inferior limit for the exchange rate.
Proposition 4: If a monopolistic firm faces a lower limit El, then the 
critical value is . 
Proof: Appendix 5.5          
11  This assumption will be relaxed in the next section when crawling pegs will be studied.
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Under an exchange rate lower limit, the increase in the firm’s value 
is superior to the increase in the opportunity costs. It means to say 
that, under an exchange regime, with managed float, the establish-
ment of an inferior limit for the exchange rate reduces the pos-
sibility of losses, with the foreign market making the exports and, 
consequently, the investment is viable, even if the nominal exchange 
rate is at a low level. This result is due to the  dependence from 
the negative root of the indicial equation given by 2. It is possible to 
show that, the expression that multiplies the difference between the 
project value and the present value of future profits in the domestic 
market is always lower when there is an inferior limit. It will be seen 
more clearly further ahead in a numerical example.
2.4.   Crawling Peg Regime
In the previous subsection we have seen what happens when superior 
and inferior limits, for the nominal exchange rate, are adopted. In 
the case of a superior limit, the active firm’s value is reduced while, 
in the case of an inferior limit, it is increased. But, what happens 
when both are adopted simultaneously in an explicit form? This is 
the case of a crawling peg regime. It should be pointed out that, in 
this regime, if the bands are too narrow it has few differences regar-
ding a fixed exchange rate regime. However, it is assumed that these 
bands are wide enough so that there is some space for fluctuation. 
Again, the interventions occur only at boundaries and else the pos-
sibility of intra marginal interventions within the band is excluded.
Under these assumptions no analytical solution to , the critical 
value for the nominal exchange under a crawling peg regime, may 
be obtained. Since there are two non linear equations with two un-
known values that remain to determine two unknowns.  As it can be 
seen in the appendix 5.6, the first difference of this model with a 
free float model is that the active firm’s value is now dependent on 
the band limits. This dependence from the band limits can be seen 
more clearly in a numerical example with =0.04, μ=0.02, I=50, 
f = d =1.1, w=3, =0.1 and EL=1 in Figure 2. It shows that the 
critical value for the nominal exchange under a crawling peg regime 
which calls the investment option is optimal decreases when the 
bandwidth increases. 
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This result is explained by the fact that a wider bandwidth im-
plies larger profit expectations due to possible exchange rate 
depreciations. 
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Figure 2 - Critical value ( ) as a function of the exchange rate superior and 
inferior limit.
Another model result is that, the crawling peg critical value will 
always be between the critical value for an inferior limit and a su-
perior limit (same value as the free float regime). It is possible to 
observe this in a simulation using the same parameter values. The 
results are in Figure 3. It shows the impact of an increase in the un-
certainty (volatility) under different exchange regimes.
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Figure 3 - Critical value (E*) as a function of  and the exchange rate limits.
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Figure 3 shows that the impact of the exchange rate volatility is dif-
ferent for the two limit types. In the model with an inferior limit, 
the increase in the volatility reduces the critical value that makes 
the investment option optimal. It occurs due to its 2 dependence, 
since . This result may be not intuitive, but a possible explana-
tion would be the fact that the inferior limit reduces the possibility 
for valorizations to occur.  Thus, an increase of the volatility will be 
noticed by the firms as an increase in the possibility for big future 
depreciations to occur and, hence, increasing the active firm’s value 
and reducing the critical value for the investment execution. The 
same occurs with the crawling peg regime, but the model is less sen-
sible to volatility increase than other exchange rate regimes. Figure 3 
shows that the critical value almost does not change as the volatility 
increases. Consequently, the crawling peg regime favors investment 
because it implies on smaller and more stable critical values. In fact, 
it is an important characteristic of this regime, because the same 
occurs when other model parameters are analyzed. It is the case of 
a change in the foreign market demand elasticity.
Campa and Goldberg (1999) show that the effects of the exchange 
rate on the firm’s investments are inversely related to its mark-up 
ratios. Investment in a highly competitive market, with low mark-up 
ratios is more dependent on exchange rate movements. Analyzing 
two-digit manufacturing sectors in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, they find that, across countries, ex-
change rates tend to have insignificant effects on investment rates 
in high mark-up sectors. However, investment responsiveness to ex-
change rates is fairly strong in low mark-up sectors. 
The model presented here reproduces authors’ model and results, 
but it goes further. Lower mark-up (high demand elasticity) firms 
need a higher exchange rate critical value to trigger investment (as 
in Campa and Goldberg, 1999), but in the crawling peg regime this 
difference is smaller than in a free float regime. In other words, in a 
free float regime, low competitive firms need greater exchange rate 
devaluations than in a crawling peg to keep the investment projects 
of these firms viable. This can be seen in Figure 4. As a result, some 
type of control over the exchange rate would be adequate, when 
local goods have more competitive external markets. Ghosh et al. 
(1997) show that the investment is about 2% of the GDP - larger 
in regimes that use some type of intervention than in float regimes 
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and that this difference is still big when appraised for countries with 
high income.
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Figure 4 Critical value (E*) as a function of the foreign market 
demand elasticity under the different exchange rate regimes.
It should be emphasized that this analysis is limited to the impact 
of the exchange rate on the investment and it does not consider the 
impact that this control would have on other economic variables, 
such as currency reserves.
3. Conclusions
This paper, based on the investment model proposed by Real 
Options theory presented a model to study investment behavior un-
der different exchange regimes. The paper contributes to the debate 
regarding investment when it detaches the importance of uncer-
tainty, since in this theme, it seems to have an excessive emphasis 
on the interest rates policy, when actually, the economic stability, is 
more relevant for investment decisions, especially in underdeveloped 
economies. The models presented show that, the larger the exchange 
rate volatility the smaller the investment. However, it is important 
to state that the proposed theoretical model does not make any 
aggregation and, therefore, its interpretation in macroeconomics 
should be cautious. Nonetheless, the main results are in accordance 
with the empirical evidence presented in the literature.   
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The paper concludes that investment is greater in a regime that 
has some exchange rate control, such as the crawling peg regime. 
Moreover, this regime presents a larger capacity to soften the impact 
on the investment of changes in other parameters, such as a market 
power loss of exporter firms. At least, this advantage in relation to 
the free float regime is a contribution of the present paper, since this 
aspect had not been addressed in the previous literature. However, 
it should be clear that these conclusions do not consider the effects 
of the regime type adoption on the remaining economic variables, 
its condition of being sustained for long periods and their impact in 
the monetary policy. The policymakers’ role is to evaluate the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each regime and to adopt the regime 
considered most appropriate.   
Finally, it is evident that more theoretical and empirical studies are 
needed to evaluate the impact of the different exchange regimes 
on investment. From a theoretical point of view, there is the need 
to build models that consider the effects of the exchange rates, not 
only in the goods prices, but also in the input costs and in the exe-
cution costs of the investment project. Another possibility is the 
inclusion of new external markets, since there is evidence that many 
firms try to export to several countries and/or to own several plants, 
exactly for the purpose of reducing exchange rate risks.    
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the option to invest will be 
optimal if , so:
          
                                                                                         (A.1)
Substituting this expression in (6) and solving to E gives:
                                                             (A.2)
Proof of Proposition 2
The option of investing is evaluated considering the value of the 
project once it is implemented (active value of the firm) and the 
opportunity cost of the project when it is not implemented (inac-
tive value of the firm). The active value of the firm is given by the 
optimality condition of Bellman’s equation:
                                              (A.3)
Where  represents the value of the option to invest. This con-
dition determines that the project expected total return (left side) 
should be equal to the capital gain (first term right) added to the 
instantaneous dividends flow (second term right). To obtain 
the Itô’s lemma is used and the expectation operator is applied. 
Substituting this expression and (6) in (7) gives:
                   (A.4)
It is a non-homogeneous ordinary differential equation. Its solution 
is composed by a homogeneous solution and a particular one. The 
particular solution can be obtained by the uncertain coefficients 
method. Conjecturing a solution with the following form:
                                         (A.5)
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Substituting this possible solution in (A.4) the following constant 
values are obtained:
    
Where . Thus, the particular solution will be:
       
                                                          (A.6)
The homogeneous solution can be obtained in the potencies form 
using E. It results in an indicial equation with two real different 
roots with different signs. In other way, this result implies that:
                                (A.7) 
Where 1 and 2 >0, k1 and k2 are constants to be determined. 
However, this problem will make economic sense only if the pos-
sibility of speculative bubbles does not exist.12 Speculative bubbles 
may be ruled out evoking “no overvaluations” and F(0)=0 conditions. 
The former implies that it is not possible to obtain gains selling the 
project for a value greater than its fundamentals, so it is necessary 
to set k1=0 to avoid it. The latter implies that k2=0 is required 
since the negative power of E goes to infinity as E goes to zero and 
goes to zero as E goes to infinity, but it does not make economic 
sense since a devaluation should increase the active firm value due 
to sales revenue in the foreign market. Under these conditions, the 
active firm value will be determined only by the particular solution 
(fundamentals).13
The inactive firm value does not have dividends, since the project 
has not been implemented yet. It is composed by the opportuni-
ty cost and by the expected project valorization. In this case, the 
Bellman equation will be:       
                                                         (A.8)
12 Equation (A.6) represents the fundamental components of the project’s value, while equa-
tion (A.7) represents the speculative components. The speculative components allow the 
project value to be greater than its fundamentals, thus it is possible to buy it and resell it 
later with a capital gain. 
13 These conditions are only valid if there is not option to abandon. 
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Using the same procedures used before, the expression for the inac-
tive firm value will be:
                              (A.9) 
This homogeneous ordinary differential equation has the form of 
Cauchy-Euler, and its solution can be obtained in the potency form. 
Its indicial equation also has two different real roots with different 
signs and thus, just as in the previous problem, the negative root 
is eliminated because F0(0)=0 condition. When E goes to zero the 
inactive firm value goes to infinity, but it does not make economic 
sense because if E is equal to zero there is no external market, so 
there is no opportunity cost. Under these conditions, the solution 
will be given by:
                                        (A.10) 
Where c1 is a constant to be determined and . 
To obtain the constant value some frontier conditions are used:
                                                         (A.11)
Where E* represents the critical value of the nominal exchange rate 
that makes the option of executing the project optimal. The first 
condition establishes that the value of the option should be the same 
as the liquid value obtained when exercising it (value matching con-
dition). The second condition establishes that these values should be 
tangent at the point where it is optimal to call the option (smooth
-pasting condition). Using these functional forms, we have a system 
with two equations and two unknowns (c1 and E*):
 
 
14  See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p. 142.
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This system has the following solutions:
                                            (A.12)
Proof of Corollary 1
It can be proved by substituting (A.12) in (A.6), so the liquid active 
firm value will be:
                                (A.13)
Where the expression under brackets multiplying I is greater than 
one, since 1>f >1. This result is a consequence of the inclusion of 
uncertainty about the nominal exchange rate in the model. So, the 
active firm liquid value should be incremented to cover the project 
value.
Proof of Proposition 3
When the monopolist faces an upper limit, the active firm value will 
be given by:1415
                                (A.14)
Where 1 is the positive root of the indicial equation and k1 is a 
constant to be determinated. In this case, a new restriction should 
be added, since there is one more constant to be determined. To 
obtain this constant, let us suppose that the superior limit is like 
a reflection barrier to a firm’s value such that . Using this 
restriction in (A.14), the constant will be given by:
                   (A.15)
15  Note that this active firm value allows deviations from fundamentals. 
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Substituting (A.15) in (A.14) it is possible to observe that the firm 
value is lower than the value without a superior limit, since the 
constant k1 is negative. This result is rather intuitive, since the su-
perior limit is a restriction to future profits and profits grow when 
the exchange rate devaluates. The active firm value with a superior 
limit in the exchange rate will be given by:
                         (A.16)
This function is defined in the interval . Besides that, the 
function that defines the inactive firm value is identical to the last 
proof and still given by (A.10), but now it is defined over the interval 
. The frontier conditions are also the same, however, now the 
purpose is to find the exchange rate critical value that makes opti-
mal call the investment option under a superior limit EH.  They are: 
 
(
((
                                                      (A.17)
 
Using this condition on the previous functions generates the following 
exchange rate critical value:
                     
( (                                          (A.18) 
Proof of Proposition 4
When there is an inferior limit given by EL>0, it is not necessary 
to use the F(0)=0 restriction to rule out speculative bubbles, sin-
ce the exchange rate already has a positive inferior limit. But, the 
overvaluation restriction remains valid. Thus, the active firm value 
will be given by:
                                     
(                                                                                         (A.19)
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Where 2>0 is a root of the indicial equation and k2 is a constant 
to be determinated. As before, the inferior limit acts like a reflec-
tion barrier, meaning that . Substituting this restriction in 
(A.19) generates the following equations:
                                       (A.20)
                                                      
                            (A.21)
So, it is possible to observe that this function is defined over the 
interval  and that the exclusion of exchange rates values lower 
than EL raises the active firm values. The inactive firm value will be 
also altered. It uses the overvaluation restriction and has the follo-
wing form:
                                                 (A.22)  
Where 2>0. This function is defined over the interval . 
Thus, in a model with an inferior limit, the frontier conditions are:
                                                         (A.23)
 
Substituting the functions in these conditions generates the follow 
exchange rate critical value:
                                                                                      (A.24)
The critical value under crawling peg regime
The construction of this problem needs the definition of the active 
firm value which is given by: 
 ρ                              (A.25)
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Where 1 and 2 >0, k1 and k2 are constants to be determined. In 
this case, speculative bubbles have already been ruled out and none 
of the constants can be eliminated from an active firm’s value, since 
this function is inferior and superior limited. It is defined in the 
interval . The constants can be obtained using the barrier 
restrictions . It generates the following values:
                                                                         
                        (A.26)
So, the constant k1 reduces the active firm value while the constant 
k2 increases it. Substituting (A.26) in (A.25) results in the following 
active firm value:
[ [ [ [ [ [  (A. 27) 
Note that the net effect of bands inclusion in active firm value is de-
pendent from the model parameters, especially the band limits (EL, 
EH), the indicial equation roots (1, 2) and foreign market demand 
elasticity (f). The inactive firm value will be given by:
                                                                  (A.28)
Where c2 is a constant to be determined. The inactive firm value 
is also bound, since it is defined over the interval . Thus, 
like the inferior limit model, the speculative bubbles possibility is 
eliminated using the overvaluation restriction. So, besides the two 
barriers restrictions, the problem has more two frontier conditions 
given by:
                                          (A.29)
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Where  denotes the critical value for the nominal exchange under 
a crawling peg regime, which calls the investment option optimal. 
Thus, there are two non-linear equations with two unknown values 
that remain to be determined, c1 and . 
This system cannot be solved analytically and an alternative way to 
obtain solutions should be used. These values are obtained through 
numerical methods, since the problem can be summarized to find 
zeros of a polynomial equation. 
